A pesar de ser una de las principales teorías de la justicia, el enfoque de las capacidades no ha abordado las cuestiones de las obligaciones hacia el medio ambiente y las generaciones futuras. Para corregir este problema, Gómez ha presentado ideas valiosas sobre cómo el enfoque podría incorporar estas obligaciones. Aunque las ideas de Gómez representan una meritoria aportación a la literatura sobre el enfoque de las capacidades, en este artículo defiendo que deben completarse con argumentos a favor de la (...) obligación de reducir el sufrimiento extremo. En particular, el enfoque de las capacidades debe defender el veganismo/vegetarianismo, la ayuda a los animales en la naturaleza y la reducción de la superpoblación humana. (shrink)

Who owns nature? The question could be less important than reducing animal sufferings in nature. It does not matter if nature does not belong to anyone or if it belongs to someone, because in both cases there are limitations, linked with animal welfare, regarding what we should do in nature. Sentient beings have interests that we must take into account when designing environmental policies. Since neither ecosystems nor plants have interests, preserving nature is less important than reducing animal sufferings. The (...) relevant moral issue is, therefore, knowing what happens to sentient animals in nature and developing policies to reduce their sufferings. This implies that we have the moral obligation of intervening in nature with the aim of reducing animal sufferings, so conservationist environmental policies defended by ecologists are morally unacceptable. (shrink)

Many publications in the field of animal ethics consider the theories of Peter Singer and Tom Regan as the main arguments for the direct moral consideration of non human animals. This paper argues that both those theories have to face serious problems that make them difficult to accept and to apply, and proposes instead an alternative based on the recent work of M. C. Nussbaum. She has drafted a theory in favor of the direct moral consideration of non human animals, (...) which solves part of the problems that the proposals of Singer and Regan could not. (shrink)